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NOTES 
 
LIMITING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1946 
CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES 
AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n April 17, 1984, demonstrators gathered outside the 
Libyan People’s Bureau in London to protest the prac-
tices of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s regime.1  Officials of the 
British government had been forewarned that if the demonstra-
tion was allowed to take place, Libya “‘would not be responsible 
for its consequences.’”2  Suddenly, during the demonstration, 
machine gunfire erupted.3  Shots were fired from inside the 
Libyan embassy toward the crowd.4  Constable Yvonne Fletcher 
was killed, and eleven others injured.5  This tragedy led to the 
severing of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom 
and Libya.6  No one was ever prosecuted.7  
This incident at the Libyan embassy illustrates how diplo-
matic immunity shields the culpable from liability.  While most 
scholars agree that some form of diplomatic immunity is neces-
sary, the doctrine has historically been criticized.  This is be-
cause diplomats enjoy absolute immunity for their official and 
  
 1. Rosalyn Higgins, The Abuse of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: 
Recent United Kingdom Experience, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 641, 643 (1985).  
 2. Id. 
 3. Joshua D. Groff, A Proposal for Diplomatic Accountability Using the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: The Decline of an Absolute 
Sovereign Right, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 209, 218 (2000). 
 4. Id.  
 5. GRANT V.  MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, 
PROBLEMS 6 (1989). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 8. 
O 
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private acts while on assignment in the receiving state.8  Com-
mentators have suggested numerous ways to curb this absolute 
immunity. These suggestions include, inter alia, creating a 
permanent international diplomatic court,9 restricting or 
amending the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,10 
and creating compensation funds and mandatory insurance so 
that the injured have recourse.11   
This Note will suggest that absolute immunity is unnecessary 
and undesirable.  It will propose limiting immunity to only 
those acts required for a diplomat to fulfill his official functions.  
It will show that the functional necessity theory of immunity 
has been successful in its application to the privileges and im-
munities of officials working in international organizations, 
such as the United Nations (“UN”).  It will argue that functional 
immunity should be applied to diplomats rather than absolute 
immunity.  Further, it will propose that an additional Protocol 
to the Vienna Convention be drafted allowing states to execute 
bilateral agreements limiting the immunity of their diplomats 
to functional immunity.  Finally it will argue that for these 
agreements to be truly effective they must provide waiver and 
settlement options similar to those used in the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.12  These options 
would make diplomats accountable for both criminal and civil 
wrongs. 
Part II of this Note will provide background on diplomatic 
immunity, including its history, theoretical underpinnings, 
codification, and cases of abuse.  Part III will provide an over-
view of the international privileges and immunities enjoyed by 
officials of the UN.  In addition, Part III will focus on the waiver 
and settlement features of the UN Convention.  Part IV will 
  
 8. See generally J. CRAIG BARKER, THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES 
AND IMMUNITIES: A NECESSARY EVIL? (1996). The sending state is the diplo-
mat’s home state and the receiving state is the foreign country where the dip-
lomat is assigned.  
 9. Groff, supra note 3, at 222-23.  
 10. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 8, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Lori J. Shapiro, For-
eign Relations Law: Modern Developments in Diplomatic Immunity, 1989 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 281, 295. 
 11. Groff, supra note 3, at 220-21. 
 12. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter UN Convention].   
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compare the immunities of diplomats to those of their interna-
tional counterparts and will argue that diplomatic immunity 
should be limited to acts necessary to carry out the diplomat’s 
official functions.  Finally, this Note will propose methods for 
enforcing the functional theory of diplomatic immunity. 
II. BACKGROUND ON DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
A. Practical Justifications for Diplomatic Immunity 
On November 4, 1979 the American embassy in Tehran was 
seized by armed students and the entire staff of the embassy 
was held hostage.13  The gunmen demanded that the United 
States (“U.S.”) extradite the Shah and apologize for its involve-
ment in internal Iranian politics over the past several decades.14  
The Iranian government took no action to help gain the release 
of the hostages, and the Iranian minister in charge of supervis-
ing the embassy commented that, “‘this occupation is certainly 
positive.’”15 The last hostages were released after 444 days in 
captivity.16  
The U.S. filed a claim before the International Court of Jus-
tice (“ICJ”).17  In its judgment of May 24, 1980 the Court held: 
  
 13. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 8. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 8–9. 
 16. Id. at 9.  
 17. Id. at 9–10. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).   
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations. Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague 
(Netherlands). . . .  It operates under a Statute largely similar to that 
of its predecessor, which is an integral part of the Charter of the 
United Nations. . . .  The Court has a dual role: to settle in accordance 
with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by States, 
and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly 
authorized international organs and agencies . . . only States may 
apply to and appear before the Court. The States Members of the 
United Nations (at present numbering 189), and one State which is 
not a Member of the United Nations but which has become party to 
the Court's Statute (Switzerland), are so entitled . . . .  The Court de-
cides in accordance with international treaties and conventions in 
force, international custom, the general principles of law and, as sub-
sidiary means, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists. 
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[T]he Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran shall . . . af-
ford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United 
States the protection, privileges and immunities to which they 
are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States, 
and under general international law, including immunity from 
any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to 
leave the territory of Iran. . . .18 
Diplomatic immunity has been described as a “necessary 
evil.”19  The above example illustrates the need to retain parts 
of the doctrine, especially those parts that provide physical pro-
tection to diplomatic personnel.  The main rationale for provid-
ing diplomatic immunity is that the individual must be allowed 
to perform his functions freely and independently without fear-
ing political persecution by the receiving state.20  Another ar-
gument put forth is that diplomatic immunity is necessary for 
the efficient functioning of the diplomatic process.21  A further 
benefit of diplomatic immunity is that it is reciprocal.22 Recip-
rocity permits governments to extend diplomatic privileges and 
immunities because these governments expect the same will be 
done for their personnel.23   
While these are all practical justifications for the doctrine of 
diplomatic immunity, they still do not support absolute immu-
nity.  For example, does it make sense to prevent civil suits by 
private individuals, where there is no intention on that individ-
ual’s part to interfere with the free and independent functions 
of the diplomat?  How do legitimate criminal prosecutions inter-
fere with the diplomatic process? Why not limit the diplomat’s 
immunity to those acts which are necessary for the exercise of 
official functions, instead of shielding them from civil and 
criminal liability?  
  
ICJ, Homepage,  at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ 
icjgnnot.html. 
 18. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
1980 I.C.J. 3, 7 (May 24). 
 19. BARKER, supra note 8, at 219. 
 20. See id. at 224. 
 21. Id. at 225. 
 22. See CLIFTON E. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 32 
(1967). 
 23. See id. at 32. 
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B. Diplomatic Immunity Defined 
Diplomatic immunity is the protection enjoyed by diplomats 
in a receiving state while representing the sending state.24  The 
scope of diplomatic immunity differs for different levels of dip-
lomatic personnel.25  This Note will focus on the diplomatic staff 
defined in Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.26  Diplomats classified in the “head of mission” cate-
gory enjoy absolute immunity, with some exceptions.27 These 
diplomats are immune for both private acts and acts carried out 
within the scope of their official functions.28  Such diplomats 
  
 24. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 1. 
 25. A diplomatic agent is a “national representative in one of four catego-
ries: 1) ambassadors, 2) envoys and ministers plenipotentiary, 3) ministers 
residents accredited to the sovereign, 4) charges d’affaires accredited to the 
minister of foreign affairs.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (7th ed. 1999). 
 26. The Vienna Convention classifies diplomatic personnel based on their 
individual functions. Article 1 states: 
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following expressions 
shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them:  
(a) the “head of the mission” is the person charged by the sending 
State with the duty of acting in that capacity;  
(b) the “members of the mission” are the head of the mission and the 
members of the staff of the mission;  
(c) the “members of the staff of the mission” are the members of the 
diplomatic staff, of the administrative and technical staff and of the 
service staff of the mission;  
(d) the “members of the diplomatic staff” are the members of the staff 
of the mission having diplomatic rank;  
(e) a “diplomatic agent” is the head of the mission or a member of the 
diplomatic staff of the mission;  
(f) the “members of the administrative and technical staff” are the 
members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative 
and technical service of the mission;  
(g) the “members of the service staff” are the members of the staff of 
the mission in the domestic service of the mission;  
(h) a “private servant” is a person who is in the domestic service of a 
member of the mission and who is not an employee of the sending 
State. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 1. 
 27. See id. art. 31. 
 28. Id. 
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are, therefore, typically immune from both criminal and civil 
violations of the law.29 
C. Traditional Theoretical Justifications for Diplomatic Immu-
nity 
The three main traditional theoretical justifications for dip-
lomatic immunity are: (1) extraterritoriality, (2) personal repre-
sentation, and (3) functional necessity.30  While parts of each 
theory taken collectively can be used to justify absolute immu-
nity,31 each one taken individually fails to justify why diplomats 
require immunity for both private and official acts.  
1. Extraterritoriality 
The theory of extraterritoriality suggests that the property of 
a diplomat and the person of the diplomat are to be treated as if 
they exist on the territory of the sending state.32 Because the 
diplomat is considered to be living in the sending state, he re-
mains immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the 
receiving state.33  This theory is ironic, considering that the dip-
lomat would not be immune for the same illegal conduct if com-
mitted in the sending state. Not surprisingly, this theory has 
been described as a legal fiction,34 and has fallen out of favor, 
but was the dominant theory during much of the 18th Century.35  
Critics view it as too expansive because it prevents states from 
restricting the privileges and immunities of diplomats.36  In 
  
 29. See EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 229 (Clarendon Press 1998) (1976).  
 30. Groff, supra note 3, at 215.  
 31. WILSON, supra note 22, at 5. 
 32. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 30. 
 33. Stephen L. Wright, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the 
Vienna Convention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 177, 196-
97 (1987).  
 34. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting Justice O’Gorman in George 
Wilson v. Fuzman Blanco, 52 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582 (1889), that extraterritoriality 
“derives support from the legal fiction that an ambassador is not an inhabi-
tant of the country to which he is accredited, but of the country of his origin 
and whose sovereign he represents, and within whose territory, in contempla-
tion of the law, he always resides”). 
 35. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 9; Wright, supra note 33, at 198–200. 
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mats.36  In short, the theory of extraterritoriality is viewed as 
excessive.37  
2. Personal Representation  
The personal representation theory is premised on the idea 
that the diplomat is a representative of a sovereign state, and 
that as the representative he is entitled to the same privileges 
as the sovereign.38  Under this theory the diplomat is viewed as 
the personification of the head of the sending state.39  This the-
ory, like extraterritoriality, is not widely accepted in modern 
diplomatic practice.40  It is criticized because in many states 
there is no longer a monarchy and sovereignty has been trans-
ferred to the people and their elected officials.41  Because “the 
people” do not enjoy immunity from prosecution in foreign 
states, their representatives should not either.42  In addition, 
the personal representation theory offers no justification for 
why diplomats should be immune from jurisdiction for their 
private acts.43  Thus, the theory of personal representation also 
fails a modern application.  
3. Functional Necessity 
Functional necessity is the most accepted theory for the justi-
fication of diplomatic immunity.44  Under this theory, privileges 
and immunities should be limited to those necessary for the 
diplomat to carry out his official functions.45  The approach is 
justified by arguing that diplomats could not fulfill their roles 
without certain privileges and immunities.46  Proponents of this 
  
 36. See Wright, supra note 33, at 199. 
 37. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 10 (quoting Trenta v. Ragonesi, Italy 
1938). 
 38. Groff, supra note 3, at 215–16. 
 39. Id. 
 40. WILSON, supra note 22, at 4.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See Groff, supra note 3, at 216.   
 43. Id.; WILSON, supra note 22, at 4.  
 44. Wright, supra note 33, at 200–04; Groff, supra note 3, at 216; 
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 32.  
 45. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 32. 
 46. Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immu-
nity, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1521 (1986).   
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theory suggest that it is dynamic and contains safeguards pre-
venting the needless expansion of privileges and immunities.47  
Indeed, functional necessity has been acknowledged in the Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,48 the international 
instrument governing diplomatic relations.49  This doctrine is 
unique, unlike its historical antecedents, because it provides 
some rational basis for restricting the immunity of diplomats, 
as long as the restrictions do not hinder the diplomat from ac-
complishing his functions.50  However, functional necessity has 
not been carried to its logical conclusion in the diplomatic con-
text.  Perhaps this is because states are fearful that their dip-
lomats would face unjust political prosecution or be rendered 
unduly cautious in carrying out their functions.  Thus, diplo-
mats still enjoy absolute immunity for their private acts, even 
though a truly functional approach would not support this de-
gree of immunity.  This theory, however, has been proven viable 
under the UN Convention.  
While functional immunity is the most accepted theory of dip-
lomatic immunity, it is not without its shortcomings.  For ex-
ample, if functional necessity was fully implemented in the dip-
lomatic context, who determines what constitutes an official 
function? Would all official acts be covered?51 Once immunity is 
limited to covering official acts, would other immunities be fur-
ther eroded? These are questions with potential solutions, and 
therefore, the theory of functional necessity presents the best 
opportunity for limiting diplomatic immunity. 
  
 47. See WILSON, supra note 22, at 17; MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 32; 
Faranghi, supra note 45, at 1522; Wright, supra note 33, at 202–03.  
 48. See Groff, supra note 3, at 216–17; Farhangi, supra note 46, at 1521; 
Wright, supra note 33, at 202-03.  
 49. While the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations acknowledges 
the theory of functional immunity it still provides for absolute immunity for 
certain classes of diplomatic personnel.   
 50. Farhangi, supra note 46, at 1522.  
 51. For example, if a diplomat was returning home from an official func-
tion, but was inebriated and killed someone, would this be an official act or an 
unofficial act?  See Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (City Court 
of New Rochelle 1946). 
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D. History of Diplomatic Immunity 
Diplomatic law is one of the oldest branches of international 
law.52  Over time, necessity forced most states to provide envoys 
basic protections; otherwise no international political system 
could exist.53 The oldest records detailing actual diplomatic 
practice emerged in the Greek city-states over 2,000 years ago.54  
The doctrine of diplomatic immunity continued to develop and 
evolve throughout the Roman and Byzantine Empires, the Mid-
dle Ages, and the Renaissance and Classical periods.55  Initially, 
much of diplomatic practice was based on custom.56  Eventually, 
these customs became rights, and the issue of whether diplo-
mats should be entitled to such rights became a legal question.57  
As a result, much of diplomatic practice required codification 
and was documented in international treaties, allowing states 
to rely on these agreements for the protection of their envoys.58   
These efforts to codify diplomatic law culminated at the 1961 
Vienna Conference, which ultimately led to the drafting of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.59  In 1953, by Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 685,60 The International Law Com-
mission (“ILC”)61 was asked to undertake the codification of dip-
  
 52. BARKER, supra note 8, at 14. 
 53. LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC 
IMMUNITY 3 (1999).   
 54. Groff, supra note 3, at 213. 
 55. Groff, supra note 3, at 213.  See also BARKER, supra note 8, at 14–25 
(discussing the evolution of diplomatic immunity). 
 56. BARKER, supra note 8, at 29.  
 57. See FREY & FREY, supra note 53, at 4. 
 58. See id.   See also BARKER, supra note 8, at 29-31 (describing the adop-
tion of the Regulation of Cambridge by the Institute of International Law in 
1895, which was the first formal attempt to codify diplomatic law: attempted 
codifications by the American Institute of International Law took place in 
1925; later The Havana Convention was drafted; The Institute of Interna-
tional Law’s revision of the 1895 Regulation occurred in 1929; and the Draft 
Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities created by Harvard Law 
School took place in 1932).  
 59. BARKER, supra note 8, at 30. 
 60. G.A. Res. 685, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 62, U.N. Doc. 
A/2361 (1952). 
 61. A description of the work of the International Law Commission is pro-
vided on the United Nations website.  
The International Law Commission was established by the General 
Assembly in 1947 to promote the progressive development of interna-
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lomatic law.62  Mr. A.E.F. Sandstrom was appointed Special 
Rapporteur, and was responsible for drafting a report on the 
issue, which was later submitted to the ILC for review.63  The 
ILC then adopted a provisional set of draft articles and com-
mentaries.64 These drafts were submitted to all Member States 
of the General Assembly for review and input. 65  After receiving 
input from twenty-one Member States, the draft was amended 
and a final draft of the Vienna Convention was submitted to the 
General Assembly.66   
E. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed 
on April 18, 196167 and entered into force on April 24, 1964.68  It 
is the seminal treaty governing diplomatic relations.69  The Vi-
enna Convention contains fifty-three articles that govern the 
behavior of diplomats, thirteen of which address the issue of 
immunity.70  The preamble of the Vienna Convention acknowl-
edges the theory of functional necessity.71  It states that the 
  
tional law and its codification. The Commission, which meets annu-
ally, is composed of 34 members who are elected by the General As-
sembly for five year terms and who serve in their individual capacity, 
not as representatives of their Governments. Most of the Commis-
sion's work involves the preparation of drafts on topics of interna-
tional law. Some topics are chosen by the Commission and others re-
ferred to it by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social 
Council. When the Commission completes draft articles on a particu-
lar topic, the General Assembly usually convenes an international 
conference of plenipotentiaries to incorporate the draft articles into a 
convention which is then open to States to become parties. 
International Law Commission, Introduction (1998), at http://www.un.org/ 
law/ilc/introfra.htm 
 62. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
[1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l. Comm’n ¶ 45, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1. 
 63. Id. ¶ 46.  
 64. Id. ¶ 47. 
 65. Id. ¶ 48.  
 66. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. One more round of changes was made to the draft, and it 
was later adopted.  
 67. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10. 
 68. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 44. 
 69. BARKER, supra note 8, at 30. 
 70. Groff, supra note 3, at 214. 
 71. See Groff, supra note 3, at 216–17; Farhangi, supra note 46, at 1521; 
Wright, supra note 33, at 202–03.   
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purpose of the Convention is “the development of friendly rela-
tions among nations, irrespective of their differing constitu-
tional and social systems,” and that the purpose of providing 
privileges and immunities “is not to benefit individuals but to 
ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic 
missions as representing States.”72  While it recognizes that 
immunity is not for the personal benefit of the diplomat, it stops 
short of fully adopting the theory of functional necessity.  
1. Overview of Relevant Articles of the Convention 
The Vienna Convention sets forth a system of diplomatic 
privileges and immunities based on (1) the functions of the dip-
lomat,73 (2) the premises used by the diplomat,74 (3) taxation 
  
 72. Vienna Convention preambular paragraphs state:  
Recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have recog-
nized the status of diplomatic agents, Having in mind the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the 
sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations, 
Believing that an international convention on diplomatic intercourse, 
privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of 
friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing con-
stitutional and social systems, Realizing that the purpose of such 
privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure 
the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as 
representing States, Affirming that the rules of customary interna-
tional law should continue to govern questions not expressly regu-
lated by the provisions of the present Convention . . . . 
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, preambular paragraphs.  
 73. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47.  Article 3 of the Vienna Convention 
states:  
1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in:  
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;  
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending 
State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by interna-
tional law;  
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;  
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments 
in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government 
of the sending State;  
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and inspections,75 (4) the person of the diplomat,76 and (5) dip-
  
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and 
the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and 
scientific relations.   
2. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as prevent-
ing the performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.  
 74. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47.  Vienna Convention Article 22 
states:  
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable.  The agents of the 
receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the 
head of the mission.  
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate 
steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or 
damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or 
impairment of its dignity.  
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property 
thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune 
from search, requisition, attachment or execution.  
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 22.  See also id. art. 30 (“1. The private 
residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protec-
tion as the premises of the mission.  2. His papers, correspondence and, except 
as provided in paragraph 3 of article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy 
inviolability.”) 
 75. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47.  Vienna Convention Article 34 
states:  
A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal 
or real, national, regional or municipal, except:  
(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in 
the price of goods or services;  
(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the 
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the 
sending State for the purposes of the mission;  
(c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving 
State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 39;  
(d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the re-
ceiving State and capital taxes on investments made in commer-
cial undertakings in the receiving State;  
(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;  
(f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp 
duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provi-
sions of article 23. 
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lomatic records and communications.77  Several articles are rele-
vant to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomats 
under the Vienna Convention.  The most relevant article relat-
ing to immunity is Article 31.78   Under Article 31, a diplomat 
receives complete immunity from criminal jurisdiction and par-
tial immunity from civil jurisdiction.79  Pursuant to Article 31, 
the diplomat loses civil immunity in three situations: (1) when 
there is a dispute over immovable property in the receiving 
  
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 34.  
 76. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47. Vienna Convention art. 29 states: 
“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to 
any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due 
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his per-
son, freedom or dignity.” 
 77. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 47.  Article 24 of the Vienna Convention 
24 states: “The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviola-
ble at any time and wherever they may be.”  Vienna Convention, su-
pra note 10, art. 24. 
 78. Vienna Convention Article 31 states:   
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal juris-
diction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its 
civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:   
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated 
in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf 
of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;  
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent 
is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a pri-
vate person and not on behalf of the sending State;  
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity 
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside 
his official functions.   
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.  
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic 
agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and 
(c) of paragraph 1 of this article, and provided that the measures con-
cerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person 
or of his residence.  
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the re-
ceiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the send-
ing State. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 31. 
 79. Id.  
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state; (2) if the diplomat is acting as an administrator, executor, 
heir, or legatee in his capacity as a private person; or (3) if the 
diplomat undertakes a commercial or professional activity 
which is not part of his official functions.80 
2. Additional Limits to Diplomatic Immunity  
There are additional limits to diplomatic immunity imposed 
by other articles of the Vienna Convention and by the sending 
state. These include, inter alia, waiver, designation of persona 
non grata, and sending state jurisdiction over its own diplo-
mats.81  These limits, however, are inadequate. While they may 
provide a way to address problematic diplomatic conduct, they 
do not provide the injured with recourse.  
Under Article 32, a diplomat may be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the receiving state’s courts if the sending state expressly 
waives the diplomat’s immunity.82  Negotiation for waiver sel-
dom occurs because the sending state has no affirmative duty to 
waive immunity, but has the option to do so.83  If waiver is 
  
 80. Id. See also DENZA, supra note 29, at 237–38, 245–50 (discussing in 
detail the exceptions related to private immovable property, private involve-
ment in succession, and professional and commercial activity). 
 81. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 126–37. 
 82. Vienna Convention Article 32 states:  
1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons 
enjoying immunity under article 37 may be waived by the sending 
State.  
2. Waiver must always be express.  
3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person 
enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under article 37 shall preclude 
him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any 
counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.  
4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or adminis-
trative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in 
respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver 
shall be necessary. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 32.  See also Farhangi, supra note 46, 
at 1522; DENZA, supra note 29, at 273–88 (discussing waiver of immunity).  
 83. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 285–86.  See also MCCLANAHAN, supra 
note 5, at 137–38 (discussing waiver of immunity). 
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granted, it is often done under benign circumstances.84  For ex-
ample, a state may grant a waiver for a diplomat or dependant 
to testify in court on behalf of another.85  The state, however, 
would probably not grant a waiver if that same diplomat or de-
pendent were subpoenaed to testify in court because of their 
own criminal wrongdoing.86  In reality, waiver is not an effective 
way of limiting diplomatic immunity because states have an 
interest in protecting their diplomats from the effect of a 
waiver.87 
Pursuant to Article 9, a diplomat may be declared persona 
non grata by the receiving state. 88  Once this designation has 
been made the sending state must recall the diplomat or termi-
nate his functions in the sending state.89  The declaration of 
persona non grata is usually reserved for behavior such as es-
pionage, terrorism, or other subversive activity, but can be used 
in other circumstances.90   
Article 9 also provides a significant legal restraint on abso-
lute immunity.91  However, because the diplomat can be re-
  
 84. See DENZA, supra note 29, at 287 (describing U.S. State Department 
practice on waiver of diplomatic immunity); MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 
137.  
 85. See DENZA, supra note 29, at 287; MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 137. 
 86. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 137. 
 87. Shapiro, supra note 10, at 285. 
 88. Vienna Convention Article 9 states:  
1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain 
its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or 
any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non 
grata or that any other member of the staff of the mission is not ac-
ceptable. In any such case, the sending State shall, as appropriate, ei-
ther recall the person concerned or terminate his functions with the 
mission. A person may be declared non grata or not acceptable before 
arriving in the territory of the receiving State.  
2. If the sending State refuses or fails within a reasonable period to 
carry out its obligations under paragraph 1 of this article, the receiv-
ing State may refuse to recognize the person concerned as a member 
of the mission. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 9.  See also MCCLANAHAN, supra note 
5, at 126–30 (describing the persona non grata doctrine); DENZA, supra note 
29, at 59–71 (chronicling the practice of Article 9).  
 89. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 9(1).  
 90. See DENZA, supra note 29, at 63–67.   
 91. See id. at 62. 
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called to the sending state, immunity is usually preserved.  If 
the sending state chooses to terminate the functions of the dip-
lomat in the receiving state, then the diplomat is no longer 
shielded by immunity.92 
Another supposed limit to diplomat immunity is that diplo-
mats may face the jurisdiction of their national courts for 
wrongs committed in the receiving state.93  While the threat of 
potential prosecution by their own state may serve to encourage 
diplomats to respect the law of the receiving state,94 a sending 
state is not required to prosecute its diplomatic personnel who 
have committed violent crimes or civil wrongs.95  More impor-
tantly, in the civil context, potential claimants are unlikely to 
have success in pursuing the claim in the sending state.96  It is 
unlikely that a claimant would be able to successfully serve 
process on the diplomat, or be able to sustain the costs of litigat-
ing the claim in the foreign country.97  Thus, this is not a viable 
alternative for those who have been seriously injured. 
3. Settlement under The Vienna Convention 
The Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplo-
matic Relations, Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Dis-
putes,98 provides for the settlement of disputes arising out of the 
  
 92. See MCCLANAHAN, supra note 5, at 128.  
 93. Id. at 136. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See id. 
 96. DENZA, supra note 29, at 265–66. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3374, 500 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].  The Optional Protocol 
states:  
The States Parties to the present Protocol and to the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Conven-
tion’, adopted by the United Nations Conference held at Vienna from 
2 March to 14 April 1961,  
Expressing their wish to resort in all matters concerning them in re-
spect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of 
the Convention to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement has been 
agreed upon by the parties within a reasonable period,  
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interpretation of the Vienna Convention.  Disputes are to be 
heard by the ICJ.99  While this is a valid attempt to provide a 
forum where states can bring claims arising out of breaches of 
the Vienna Convention,100 it does not provide settlement options 
for individuals who are injured as a result of diplomatic mis-
conduct.   Moreover, the ICJ typically only hears cases involving 
severe breaches of the Vienna Convention.101  The Court is not 
the most efficient way of addressing breaches of the Vienna 
Convention because most issues that arise must be resolved 
more expeditiously, usually at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.102    
F. Cases of Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity 
Some diplomats have abused their immunity by committing 
criminal and civil wrongs. The most stereotypical abuse is in 
connection with parking tickets and other minor motor vehicle 
  
Have agreed as follows:   
Article I 
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Con-
vention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the 
Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a 
Party to the present Protocol. 
. . . . 
Article III 
1. Within the same period of two months, the parties may agree to 
adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the International 
Court of Justice.  
2. The conciliation commission shall make its recommendations 
within five months after its appointment.  If its recommendations are 
not accepted by the parties to the dispute within two months after 
they have been delivered, either party may bring the dispute before 
the Court by an application. 
Id.  
 99. See id. art. I.   
 100. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. 
v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); The Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2000 I.C.J. 182, (Dec. 8) (for examples 
of States bringing claims arising out of the Vienna Convention to the ICJ). 
 101. See id. 
 102. DENZA, supra note 29, at 421. 
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offenses.103  These, however, are among the least egregious 
types of offenses.104  Abuse often extends to serious breaches of 
state and federal law, including, inter alia, drunk driving, drug 
smuggling, and other acts of physical violence.105    
One recent example is the case of Ahmed v. Hoque.106  The 
plaintiff, a domestic servant of the defendant, the Economics 
Minister for the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to 
the UN, claimed that he had been enslaved and assaulted in 
violation of New York State law, federal law, and international 
treaties and conventions.107  The plaintiff was brought to the 
U.S. to work in the home of the defendant and his wife, and was 
paid only $20 per month.108  The plaintiff often worked fifteen 
hour days and was allotted approximately two hours of free 
time per day.109  The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant 
pushed him to the ground causing him to cut his hand.110  The 
defendant claimed diplomatic immunity.111  The court dismissed 
the complaint, allowing the defendant to successfully assert his 
privilege and avoid compensating the plaintiff for his injuries.112 
  
 103. Michael Cooper, More Diplomatic Parking Causes Some to Grumble, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1997, at B3; Bob Minzesheimer, Delinquent Diplomats: 
Soviets Rank First In Unpaid Parking Tickets, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 20, 
1983, at 11; Eduardo Cue, Diplomat Parking Tickets Put at 80 Per Cent Un-
paid, WASH. POST, May 5, 1977, at B5. 
 104. These minor, but repeated offenses, nonetheless evidence a systematic 
disregard for the laws of the receiving state.  It should be noted that even 
these minor offenses cost local municipalities significant sums of money.  
 105. Michael B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and 
Immunity, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 475, 488 (1997).  
 106. Ahmed v. Hoque, 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002). 
 107. Id. at 1.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2. Ahmed claimed that Hoque’s immunity was governed by the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and not 
the Vienna Convention.  Hence, Ahmed claimed that Hoque was acting out-
side the scope of his functions, and therefore should not be entitled to immu-
nity. The court noted that under Article IV, Section 11 of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, representatives of Mem-
ber States like Hoque, unlike employees of the UN, enjoy the same level of 
immunity as diplomats under the Vienna Convention.  
 112. Id. at 8. 
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Another example is Tabion v. Mufti, which illustrates how 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention functions in practice.113  In 
this case, a domestic servant sued her employer, who was First 
Secretary at the Embassy of Jordan to the U.S.114  The domestic 
servant alleged, inter alia, breach of her employment contract, 
false imprisonment, and race discrimination.115  She also al-
leged that the defendant paid her only 50¢ per hour and confis-
cated her passport.116  The defendant filed a motion to quash, 
claiming diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention.117   
The plaintiff opposed the motion under Article 31(1)(c),118 argu-
ing that “a diplomatic agent shall not be immune from civil ac-
tions ‘relating to any professional or commercial activity exer-
cised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside of 
his official functions.’”119  The plaintiff contended that her em-
ployment relationship with the defendant constituted a “com-
mercial activity” within the meaning of Article 31, and therefore 
the defendant was not immune from suit.120  The district court, 
while noting that the outcome might be perceived as unjust, 
held that the plaintiff’s employment relationship was not 
“commercial activity” within the meaning ascribed by Article 
31.121  The plaintiff appealed the judgment, but the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.122   Thus, the court 
  
 113. Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d 73 F.3d 535 
(4th Cir. 1996). 
 114. Id. at 286.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 287.  
 118. Vienna Convention, supra note 74, art. 31. 
 119. Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 287 (quoting Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention).  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 292. 
 122. Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).  The court stated that:  
It is evident from the foregoing authorities that the phrase “commer-
cial activity,” as it appears in the Article 31(1)(c) exception, was in-
tended by the signatories to mean “commercial activity exercised by 
the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official func-
tions.” Day-to-day living services such as dry cleaning or domestic 
help were not meant to be treated as outside a diplomat's official 
functions. Because these services are incidental to daily life, diplo-
mats are to be immune from disputes arising out of them.   
Id. at 538–39.  
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preserved the immunity of the defendant, leaving the plaintiff 
without a remedy.  
In Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, the plaintiff had 
been shot by the grandson of the ambassador of Brazil to the 
U.S.123  The grandson asserted diplomatic immunity under the 
Vienna Convention, and the court dismissed the complaint.124  
This situation underscores one of the more serious flaws of the 
Vienna Convention.  Pursuant to Article 37, the extended fam-
ily of the diplomat is protected from legal process, and thus is 
able to escape prosecution by virtue of his or her relationship to 
the diplomat.125  Under no circumstances does the theory of 
functional immunity support the extension of immunity to the 
family of diplomatic personnel.  
Yet another example is the story of Alexander Kashin, a Rus-
sian citizen who was paralyzed from the neck down when a car 
driven by an American diplomat broadsided his car.126  Because 
the incident occurred in Russia, where the American envoy was 
stationed, he asserted diplomatic immunity and avoided the 
jurisdiction of Russian courts.127  Kashin has moved to the U.S. 
to pursue litigation against the American envoy, but thus far to 
no avail.128  The Kashin example is just one of many of these 
kinds of incidents, most of which are reported by the media, but 
which never get fully litigated, if at all.129 
  
 123. Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (D.C. 
1983). 
 124. Id. at 1416.  See also Aldi v. Yaron, 672 F. Supp. 516 (D.C. 1987) (hold-
ing that former Brigadier General was entitled to diplomatic immunity for 
action taken by him as a general once he became an attaché in embassy in the 
U.S.).  
 125. See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, art. 37 (“The members of the 
family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are 
not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities speci-
fied in articles 29 to 36.”).  These privileges and immunities include immunity 
from criminal and civil jurisdiction. 
 126. Tom Jackman, Judge Moves Russian’s Suit Against U.S. Diplomat, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2002, at A17. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. See also Matt Nixson, Foreign Envoys Get Away With Crime — And 
Owe Britain GBP 1.5m, MAIL ON SUNDAY, July 21, 2002, at 11 (exposing that 
British diplomats have escaped criminal prosecution on twenty-one separate 
occasions by hiding behind the cloak of diplomatic immunity); Catherine Wil-
son, Saudi Prince Used Diplomatic Cover To Smuggle Tons of Cocaine, DEA 
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Unsurprisingly, it is this type of misconduct that elicits moral 
outrage by the public and suggests that there must be a limit to 
diplomatic immunity.  By restricting the immunity to only offi-
cial acts, these types of cases would be fully litigated and the 
injured would at least have some hope of being compensated for 
their losses.   
III. BACKGROUND ON INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 
International immunity describes the immunity enjoyed by 
international organizations and their personnel.130  This Note 
will focus on officials of the UN.  Articles 104131 and 105132 of the 
UN Charter provide the framework for the development of the 
  
Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 18, 2002, at A7 (describing how a Saudi Prince 
used his diplomatic immunity to smuggle 4,400 pounds of cocaine on his pri-
vate jet from Venezuela to Paris); Andrea Perry & Tim Shipman, Political 
Storm Erupts as Suspects Claim Diplomatic Immunity; Embassy Staff Evade 
Quiz Over Murder, SUNDAY EXPRESS, May 26, 2002, at 6 (describing how two 
Colombian diplomats refused to be questioned in connection with the murder 
of a young British father); Pamela Ferdinand, Law Deposed in Pedophilia 
Case; Prelate Says He Does Not Recall Letters Warning About Convicted 
Priest, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002, at A2 (suggesting that Cardinal Law might 
try to flee to Rome because he has dual citizenship with the Vatican and could 
claim diplomatic immunity, thereby avoiding testifying in pedophilia cases). 
 130. PETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: A FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL STATUS 
AND IMMUNITIES 153 (1994).  
 131. U.N. CHARTER art. 104 (“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of 
each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise 
of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.”). 
 132. U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 1–3.  
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Mem-
bers such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfill-
ment of its purposes.  
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials 
of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immuni-
ties as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in 
connection with the Organization.  
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to 
determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
this article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United 
Nations for this purpose.  
Id. 
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privileges and immunities of the organization and its officials.133  
International immunities of UN officials are premised on func-
tional necessity as articulated in Article 105(2) of the UN Char-
ter.134 
On February 13, 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN.135  This 
Convention set forth the system of privileges and immunities of 
the organization, to more fully define the concept of privileges 
and immunities characterized in the Charter.136 
A. The History Of International Immunity 
International immunities first appeared during the 19th Cen-
tury, even though the development of international organiza-
tions did not begin to drastically increase until the post World 
War II period.137   Initially, many of the international organiza-
tions that were established, such as the International Postal 
Union, did not require privileges and immunities because they 
did not have a political mandate, and therefore the rationale for 
immunity did not exist.138  When international organizations 
began to emerge that did serve a political function, many 
granted officials diplomatic immunity because it offered a con-
venient model.139  This misapplication of diplomatic immunity 
to officials working in international organizations created doc-
trinal confusion, because the international official’s primary 
duty was to represent the organization, not their home state. 140  
  
 133. See generally THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 
1314–25 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002) (1994) [hereinafter THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS]. 
 134. See id. at 1317.  
 135. U.N. Convention, supra note 12.  
 136. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, 
DOCUMENTS, APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THE CONVENTION ON 
THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 184, Sales No. 627 
(1992) [hereinafter I.C.J. PLEADINGS]. 
 137. See Charles H. Brower, II, International Immunities: Some Dissident 
Views on the Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1, 8-9 (2000). See also 
C. WILFRED JENKS, INTERNATIONAL IMMUNITIES 1–16 (1961) (providing a brief 
history of international immunities). 
 138. Brower, supra note 137, at 9. 
 139. Id. at 11.  
 140. Id. at 16. 
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This misapplication had a dual effect.141  First, international 
officials were susceptible to pressure by their own state to work 
toward the state’s interests rather than the international or-
ganization’s, and second, the extension of absolute immunity to 
this category of individuals risked undermining their account-
ability for private acts.142  
Recognizing the doctrinal confusion, the drafters of the UN 
Charter sought to avoid this by categorically adopting func-
tional, rather than diplomatic, immunities for the organization 
and its officials.143  The drafting of the Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of the UN was proposed by the Prepara-
tory Commission of the UN.144  The Preparatory Commission 
recommended to the General Assembly that it should propose 
such a convention pursuant to Articles 104 and 105 of the UN 
Charter.145  On February 13, 1946 the General Assembly, on the 
advice and counsel of the Sixth (Legal) Committee and the Sub-
Committee on Privileges and Immunities, adopted Resolution 6 
which approved the text of the Convention and proposed it for 
accession by Member States.146   
B. The 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
UN 
Pursuant to Article 105 of the UN Charter, the UN Conven-
tion, unlike the Vienna Convention, limits the privileges and 
immunities of UN officials to those that are “necessary for the 
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the 
Organization.”147  Thus, the theory of functional necessity is 
carried to its logical conclusion in the UN Convention.148  By 
  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 16–18.  
 144. I.C.J. PLEADINGS, supra note 136, at 184.  
 145. Id. After recommending that the General Assembly propose such a 
convention, the Preparatory Commission proposed draft text of the convention 
and submitted it to the General Assembly. The General Assembly then re-
ferred it to the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the Assembly, which then referred 
it to the Sub-Committee on Privileges and Immunities. 
 146. G.A. Res. 6, at 26–28, Feb. 13, 1946.   
 147. U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1). See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS, supra note 133, at 1314–25. 
 148. Although functional immunity is granted to officials of the UN, the 
General Convention grants diplomatic immunity to the representatives of 
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uniformly applying the functional approach to immunity, the 
UN Convention prevents officials from abusing immunities for 
personal benefit.149 Indeed, UN officials only have immunity for 
acts undertaken in an official capacity.  
  
Member States. This grant of diplomatic immunity to representatives of 
Member States is one of the flaws of the Convention.  Article IV, sec. 11 
states:  
Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of 
the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Na-
tions, shall, while exercising their functions and during the journey to 
and from the place of meeting, enjoy the following privileges and im-
munities:   
a. immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure 
of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or 
written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representa-
tives, immunity from legal process of every kind;  
b. inviolability for all papers and documents;   
c. the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspondence 
by courier or in sealed bags;   
d. exemption in respect of themselves and their spouses from 
immigration restrictions, aliens registration or national service 
obligations in the state they are visiting or through which they 
are passing in the exercise of their functions;  
e. the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restric-
tions as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments 
on temporary official missions;  
f. the same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal 
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys, and also;  
g. such other privileges, immunities and facilities not inconsis-
tent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy, except that 
they shall have no right to claim exemption from customs duties 
on goods imported (otherwise than as part of their personal bag-
gage) or from exercise duties or sales taxes. 
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. IV, sec. 11.  
 149. Id. art. V, sec. 20 states in part: “Privileges and immunities are 
granted to officials in the interests of the UN and not for the personal benefit 
of the individuals themselves. . . .”  See also Statement by Secretary-General 
Trygve Lie in The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges 
and Immunities: A Study Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.118 
and Add.1 and 2, reprinted in [1967] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n ¶¶ 248–49 [here-
inafter ILC Study (1967)] (“United Nations personnel do not enjoy immunity 
from arrest or interrogation for alleged acts unrelated to their official duties 
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1. Relevant Articles of the Convention 
Under the UN Convention there are four groups that receive 
immunity. The first group includes high level personnel, such 
as the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries-General, as 
well as representatives of Member States.150  These individuals 
receive diplomatic immunity.151  The second, third, and fourth 
categories include the organization itself, officials of the UN, 
and experts on mission.152  These three groups have functional 
immunity, rather than diplomatic immunity.153 
For the purposes of this Note, Article V, Section 18 of the UN 
Convention is the most relevant because it describes the immu-
nity given to officials of the organizations.154  Under Section 
  
which are unlawful in the Member States where they are committed or al-
leged to have been committed”); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra 
note 133, at 1320–22 (providing a broad overview of UN practice as it relates 
to officials of the UN).  
 150. Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Account-
ability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 109–10 
(2002).  
 151. See UN Convention art. V, sec. 19; art. IV, sec. 11 (describing the dip-
lomatic immunity of the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries-
General, as well as the diplomatic immunity of Representatives of Member 
States). 
 152. Rawski, supra note 150, at 110–11. 
 153. See generally  UN Convention arts. I–III, V, VI (describing the func-
tional immunity of the organization, its officials and its experts).  
 154. UN Convention art. V, sec. 18 states:  
Officials of the United Nations shall:  
a. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or 
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity;  
b. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid 
to them by the United Nations;  
c. be immune from national service obligations;  
d. be immune, together with their spouses and relatives depend-
ent on them, from immigration restrictions and alien registra-
tion;  
e. be accorded the same privileges in respect of exchange facili-
ties as are accorded to the officials of comparable ranks forming 
part of diplomatic missions to the Government concerned;  
 
File: MAGINNIS Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  6/21/2003 11:48 AM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM 
1014 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
18(a), officials are entitled to “be immune from legal process in 
respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by 
them in their official capacity.”155  This immunity is intended to 
enable UN officials to accomplish the work of the organization 
in an unrestricted fashion.  According to UN practice “any act 
which is performed by [UN] officials, experts or consultants 
which is directly related to the mission or project, such as driv-
ing to and from a project site, would constitute prima facie an 
official act within the meaning of Section 18(a).”156   
Under the Convention, it is the Secretary-General, and not 
local judicial authorities, who determine what constitutes an 
official act for the purposes of asserting immunity.157  The ICJ 
  
f. be given, together with their spouses and relatives dependent 
on them, the same repatriation facilities in time of international 
crisis as diplomatic envoys;  
g. have the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects 
at the time of first taking up their post in the country in ques-
tion. 
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 18.  See also 1976 U.N. Ju-
rid. Y.B. 223–24, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/14 (providing that UN sala-
ries are not subject to garnishment, but that deductions from salaries 
and allowances of staff members is permitted, in the Secretary Gen-
eral’s discretion, for debts to third parties); 1975 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 191–
92, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/12, 1984 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 185–86, U.N. 
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/22 (describing the Secretary-General’s discretion-
ary authority to grant to a staff member special leave to complete mili-
tary service in his/her own country under certain circumstances, but 
noting that UN officials are exempt from military service).  See gener-
ally THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 133, at 1320–21 
(chronicling the practice of the United Nations as it relates to article V, 
sec. 18 of the UN Convention); UNITED NATIONS,  REPERTORY OF 
PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANS, Supp. 6, Volume VI, arts. 92–
105, 108-11, at 158–73, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.10 (1999) (providing UN 
practice as it relates to article 105 of the UN Charter).  
 155. See UN Convention, supra note 151, art. V, sec. 18(a). 
 156. 1985 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 154–55, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/23. 
 157. 1995 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 403–04, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/33.  See also 
The Practice of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency Concerning Their Status, Privileges and Immu-
nities: Supplementary Study Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.383 and Add. 1–3, 177 (recognizing that it is exclusively the right of 
the Secretary-General and not national tribunals to determine what consti-
tutes an official act).  Under Article V, Section 20 of the Convention, the Secu-
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underscored the Secretary-General’s authority to assert immu-
nity in one of its advisory opinions.158  The Court concluded that 
the decisions of the Secretary-General regarding immunity are 
to be given a presumption of validity, and that such a finding on 
his part can only be “set aside for the most compelling reasons 
and is thus to be given the greatest weight by national 
courts.”159 
Officials of the UN include all staff members of the UN, re-
gardless of nationality, residence place of recruitment, or 
rank.160  In addition, under Article VI, Section 22 experts on 
mission for the UN are accorded privileges and immunities so 
they may carry out the work they were hired to perform on be-
half of the organization.161 
  
rity Council has the authority to waive the immunity of the Secretary-
General.  
 158. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, ¶ 60 (Apr. 29, 
1999)  
As the Court has observed, the Secretary-General, as the chief ad-
ministrative officer of the Organization, has the primary responsibil-
ity to safeguard the interests of the Organization; to that end, it is up 
to him to assess whether its agents acted within the scope of their 
functions and, where he so concludes, to protect these agents, includ-
ing experts on mission, by asserting their immunity.  This means 
that the Secretary-General has the authority and responsibility to in-
form the Government of a member State of his finding and, where 
appropriate, to request it to act accordingly and, in particular, to re-
quest it to bring his finding to the knowledge of the local courts if acts 
of an agent have given or may give rise to court proceedings.  
Id.; Rawski, supra note 150, at 112–13.  
 159. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rap-
porteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29, 
1999); Rawski, supra note 150, at 112–13.  
 160. G.A. Res. 76(1) at 189, Dec. 7, 1946.  However, staff that are locally 
recruited and assigned to hourly rates are not considered officials within the 
definition.  
 161. UN Convention art. VI, sec. 22 states:  
Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V) 
performing missions for the United Nations shall be accorded such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exer-
cise of their functions during the period of their missions, including 
the time spent on journeys in connexion with their missions. In par-
ticular they shall be accorded:   
 
File: MAGINNIS Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  6/21/2003 11:48 AM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM 
1016 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
2. Case Law Demonstrating the Privileges and Immunities of 
the UN   
One of the first cases to test the system of privileges and im-
munities set out by the UN Charter was Westchester County v. 
Ranollo.162  Ranollo, chauffer of then Secretary-General of the 
UN, the Honorable Trygve Lie, was arrested for speeding while 
driving the Secretary-General to an official UN conference.163  
The court held that Ranollo was not acting in his official capac-
ity and was therefore not immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts.164  The UN strongly disagreed with this holding and 
subsequent U.S. jurisprudence would suggest that, if the case 
were tried today, Ranollo would be protected under the UN 
Convention because he was acting in his official capacity. 165 
  
a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure 
of their personal baggage;  
b) in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in 
the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from 
legal process of every kind. This immunity from legal process 
shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the persons 
concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Na-
tions;  
c) inviolability for all papers and documents;  
d) for the purpose of their communications with the United Na-
tions, the right to use codes and to receive papers or correspon-
dence by courrier or in sealed bags;  
e) the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restric-
tions as are accorded to representatives of foreign governments 
on temporary official missions;   
f) the same immunities and facilities in respect of their personal 
baggage as are accorded to diplomatic envoys.  
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. VI, sec. 22. 
 162. Westchester County v. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (City Court of New 
Rochelle 1946).  
 163. Lawrence Preuss, Immunity of Officers and Employees of the United 
Nations for Official Acts: The Ran[o]llo Case, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 555, 556 
(1947). 
 164. Ranollo, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 35.  
 165. See ILC Study (1967), supra note 149, ¶ 255 (describing the position of 
the Secretariat vis-à-vis the Ranollo case).  
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Another early case of functional immunity as applied by U.S. 
courts was U.S. v. Coplon.166  Although at this time the U.S. had 
not yet acceded to the UN Convention, it was a Member of the 
UN and was bound by the provisions of Article 105 of the Char-
ter.167  The defendant, a citizen of the Soviet Union and an em-
ployee of the UN, was charged with espionage.168 Although the 
defendant asserted immunity, the court held that “unlawful 
espionage is not a function of the defendant as an employee of 
the UN.”169  
In People v. Leo, the defendant, a Tanzanian national em-
ployed by the UN, was charged with assault and resisting ar-
rest.170  He asserted immunity based on his UN employment.171  
The court held against the defendant and distinguished be-
tween diplomatic immunity and the immunity enjoyed by UN 
officials: “[Immunity] is limited in scope and purpose to protec-
tion for acts committed by UN officials in the course of accom-
plishing their functions as UN employees in distinction to the 
unlimited form of immunity traditionally accorded diplo-
mats.”172  The court went on to hold that “an analysis of the 
facts in this case, in the most liberal perspective possible, fails 
to demonstrate any basis whatsoever upon which to conclude 
that defendant was acting in his official capacity or that there 
was some reasonable relationship between the alleged alterca-
tion and defendant’s UN employment.”173  
These cases illustrate that the functional approach an-
nounced in the UN Charter and used in the UN Convention 
provides the injured with recourse.   
  
 166. U.S. v. Coplon, 84 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
 167. Id. at 474.  
 168. Id. at 473.  
 169. Id. at 474.  Cf. De Luca v. United Nations Organization, 41 F.3d 1502 
(2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1051 (1995) (affirming the District 
Court’s decision to uphold the immunity of the UN and individual UN officers 
who were being sued for the alleged failure to reimburse the UN employee for 
withheld income taxes); Askir v. Boutros-Ghali, 933 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (holding that a UN official could not be held liable in an individual ca-
pacity for acts undertaken in an official capacity as set forth in the Conven-
tion on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations).  
 170. People v. Leo, 407 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978).  
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 943.  
 173. Id.  
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3. Waiver and Settlement under the UN Convention  
There are two mechanisms provided for in the UN Conven-
tion that allow the injured to seek compensation and the send-
ing state to prosecute criminal wrongs: waiver and settlement.  
a. Waiver 
Article V, Section 20 solidifies the functional approach of the 
UN Convention174 by requiring the Secretary-General to waive 
immunity even when an official of the UN has acted within his 
official capacity, but where the waiver of immunity is required 
so as not to impede the course of justice.175  The authority to 
waive immunity has been delegated by the Secretary-General to 
the Legal Counsel of the UN.176  In evaluating whether to waive 
immunity, the Secretary-General, acting through the Legal 
Counsel “consider[s] . . . whether the immunity of any UN offi-
cial would impede the course of justice and whether it can be 
waived without prejudice to the interests of the organization.”177  
In the majority of cases  reported to the Office of Legal Affairs 
immunity has been waived where justice so required.178  
  
 174. UN Convention Article V, Section 20 states:  
Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of 
the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals 
themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the duty 
to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opin-
ion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be 
waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations. In 
the case of the Secretary-General, the Security Council shall have the 
right to waive immunity. 
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 20.  
 175. Brower, supra note 137, at 29.  See also 1995 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 403-4, 
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/33 (describing the Secretary-General’s duty to waive 
immunity when immunity would impede justice). 
 176. 1978 U.N. Jurid. Y.B., 191, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/16.  
 177. PROCEDURES IN PLACE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 8, SECTION 29, OF 
THE CONVENTION ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ON 13 FEBRUARY 1946 : REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., at 12 U.N. Doc. A/C.5/49/65 
(1995) [hereinafter UN Settlement Policy].  See also Rawski, supra note 150, 
at 112-13 (criticizing the method of waiver under the UN Convention).  
 178. UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177, at 12. “In a few cases, however, 
the Organization has not waived immunity but has cooperated with the com-
petent authorities, on a strictly voluntary basis, by providing, for example, the 
necessary information with a view to assisting the authorities in the proper 
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The Secretary-General determines in essence what consti-
tutes an official act for the purposes of waiver. This does not 
mean, however, that there can be no independent review of the 
Secretary-General’s decisions regarding waiver.179  These deci-
sions can be subject to the review of the ICJ.180  
Commentator Charles Brower has argued that the ICJ’s abil-
ity to review determinations concerning waiver, lends to a genu-
ine legal restriction on the immunities of the UN and its offi-
cials.181 
b. Settlement  
Article VIII, Section 29 permits the UN to settle with claim-
ants.182  When a dispute involves a UN official who has acted in 
a private capacity, waiver is not an issue because the official is 
in the same position as any other private individual.183 How-
ever, if the Secretary-General determines that the official was 
acting in an official capacity and that the interests of the or-
ganization do not permit a waiver, the UN has traditionally set-
tled with the claimants.184  
The settlement process described in Article VIII, Section 29 
has been developed with specificity by the UN in its policy 
document entitled Procedures in place for implementation of 
Article 8, Section 29, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the UN, adopted by the General Assembly, on 13 
February 1946, Report of the Secretary-General.185    
  
administration of justice and preventing the occurrence of any abuse of privi-
leges and immunities.”  Id. 
 179. Brower, supra note 137, at 30–31. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. UN Convention art.VIII, sec. 29 states:  
The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of 
settlement of: a. disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of 
a private law character to which the United Nations is a party; b. 
disputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of 
his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been 
waived by the Secretary-General. 
UN Convention, supra note 12, art. VIII, sec. 29. 
 183. ILC Study (1967), supra note 149, ¶ 387.  
 184. Id.  
 185. UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177.   
File: MAGINNIS Base Macro Final.doc Created on:  6/21/2003 11:48 AM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:26 PM 
1020 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
Although the Convention does not specifically provide a 
mechanism to deal with claims brought against officials who 
have acted in an official capacity, and whose immunity has not 
been waived, it does state in Article VIII, Section 29 that the 
UN will make provisions for appropriate forms of settlement.186  
Additional guidance is provided by Article V, Section 21, which 
states that the UN will “cooperate at all times with the appro-
priate authorities of Members to facilitate the proper admini-
stration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations 
and prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connection with the 
privileges, immunities and facilities set out in Article V.”187 
Thus, the Convention provides a two-tiered system in which 
those injured by UN officials have recourse.  They may either 
seek a remedy through national courts if the Secretary-General 
waives immunity, or settle under the provisions of the UN set-
tlement policy when immunity has not been waived. 
IV. A COMPARISON OF DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
IMMUNITIES 
The most striking difference between the UN Convention and 
the Vienna Convention is that the former fully employs the 
functional necessity theory while the later attempts to imple-
ment it, but fails.   This difference is evidenced by the two obvi-
ous, yet deceiving, similarities between the conventions.  Both 
have a mechanism for settling disputes and both provide for 
waiver of immunity in certain circumstances.  However, the 
substantive application differs in each because of the competing 
theoretical approaches of absolute immunity and functional 
immunity. 
A. Settlement 
Under the privileges and immunities framework set out in 
the UN Convention,188 claimants may pursue a remedy by seek-
ing a settlement with the UN when immunity has not been 
waived.189  While the UN settlement policy does not specifically 
describe what type of settlement will be offered, the organiza-
  
 186. Id. at 12. 
 187. UN Convention, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 22.  
 188. See supra Part II. 
 189. See generally UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177. 
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tion does commit to making “appropriate modes of settlement” 
available to those who are injured.190  Thus, under the UN 
framework, the organization makes settlement available for 
claimants who have been injured by UN officials who have re-
tained immunity.191  In those cases in which the UN official does 
commit a criminal or civil wrong while acting in his private ca-
pacity, he or she is responsible and provisions for settlement are 
unnecessary.  
In contrast, the system of privileges and immunities in the 
Vienna Convention has no provision for private settlement.  
While it does provide for settlement under the Optional Proto-
col, the Protocol only covers disputes between states and not 
individuals.192  The Vienna Convention overlooks the costs in-
flicted on individuals by diplomatic personnel.  
B. Waiver 
Waiver is the second mechanism used by both Conventions to 
assure accountability. Under the UN Convention, the Secre-
tary-General is required to waive the immunity of individuals 
who have acted within their official capacity when not doing so 
would impede the course of justice.193  This adds another layer 
of protection to potential litigants.  They are first protected by 
the doctrine of functional immunity itself, and in addition, 
waiver is available if justice so requires.  
While the Vienna Convention does allow the sending state to 
waive the immunity of its diplomats, this seldom happens.194  
The Vienna Convention’s reliance on the sending state to waive 
the immunity of its own diplomat creates an inherent conflict of 
interest. The situations in which a diplomat’s immunity may be 
waived are usually politically charged, and therefore are not 
available for average offenses which harm others.  
  
 190. Id. at 12. 
 191. Id.  
 192. See Optional Protocol, supra note 98.  
 193. UN Settlement Policy, supra note 177, at 12.  
 194. See supra Part II.E, for a discussion of waiver and settlement.  
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V. CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCING A FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH TO DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
Diplomatic immunity should be reformed to fully incorporate 
the theory of functional necessity and to provide additional 
safeguards to potential plaintiffs under this theory.  These safe-
guards include the mechanisms of settlement and waiver im-
plemented under the UN Convention described in Part III.B.   
This objective could be accomplished by drafting an addi-
tional protocol to the Vienna Convention that permits states to 
execute bilateral agreements to limit the immunity of their dip-
lomats to functional immunity.195  By enabling states to opt into 
such an agreement, it allows states who truly fear diplomatic 
persecution to continue using the regime set forth under the 
Vienna Convention.  Such a protocol, however, provides an al-
ternative for states that are willing to curtail absolute immu-
nity. If enough states execute such agreements, the functional 
approach may, at some point, ripen into a rule of customary 
international law, whereby all states would be bound to respect 
functional immunity.196  In addition, this approach respects 
state sovereignty and allows states to choose how their diplo-
matic personnel will be treated.  It also addresses the issue of 
reciprocity, in that states who execute such agreements would 
be assured the same treatment for their diplomats in the receiv-
ing state.   
Such an agreement would not be in derogation of the other 
protections and doctrines contained within the Vienna Conven-
tion. The agreement would supercede those parts of the Con-
vention dealing with absolute immunity, while respecting those 
sections providing other protections.197  
  
 195. There is some precedent for these kinds of bilateral agreements. For 
example, the U.S. has negotiated such agreements with other states to pro-
hibit the surrender of U.S. nationals to the International Criminal Court. 
Although the reasons for these agreements have been controversial, they 
serve as a possible model.  See Jennifer Trahan & Andrew Egan, U.S. Opposi-
tion to the International Criminal Court, 30 HUM. RTS. 10 (2003) (for a discus-
sion of these agreements).  
 196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987). 
 197. There are several articles of the Vienna Convention that confer protec-
tion of diplomatic premises, and inviolability of diplomatic correspondence. 
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The lesson to be learned from the UN Convention is that it 
fully implements functional immunity, but at the same time 
provides additional safeguards to assure that this limited im-
munity is not abused.  Thus, these bilateral agreements, to be 
truly useful and to provide the injured with recourse, must pro-
vide the additional protections of waiver and settlement con-
ferred by the UN Convention.  
In situations where a diplomat is protected by functional im-
munity, but where waiver may be required to assure that jus-
tice is done, a non-political system of determining whether to 
waive must be established.  The sending state and receiving 
state would have to develop a procedure whereby the represen-
tatives of each have input into the decision of whether to waive 
functional immunity.  This would mitigate the fear that immu-
nity was being waived in order to politically persecute the dip-
lomat.  If a dispute did arise between states as to whether to 
waive immunity, such a question could be referred to the ICJ.  
As is the case under the UN Convention, the ICJ may review 
waiver decisions of the Secretary-General, thereby creating a 
genuine restraint on immunity.198  In addition, because the ICJ 
is already empowered under the Optional Protocol to hear dis-
putes among states regarding diplomatic immunity, it would be 
in the best position to help decide questions regarding the 
granting of a waiver.  
These agreements must also call for settlement funds to be 
established so that if individuals are harmed by a diplomat per-
forming official acts, they may still recover for their injuries. 
If states implement these mechanisms, diplomats will be held 
accountable for their actions, when both acting in a private and 
official capacity. Justice so requires.  
Veronica L. Maginnis∗ 
  
These provisions would be unaffected by such an agreement because they do 
not implicate the doctrine of diplomatic immunity.  
 198. See Brower, supra note 137, at 31.  
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